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Abstract
While there is a great number of electronic voting protocols pro-
posed in the literature, only a handful of them are actually deployed.
Still, these few available schemes require voters to completely trust
the poll provider with the anonymity of their votes and/or the in-
tegrity of the results. More robust schemes with better privacy and
integrity guarantees do exist, however, they are complex to deploy
and, therefore, are not suitable for small to medium scale voting
scenarios (e.g. electing the board of directors of an international
society). In this paper, we present avisPoll, a practical electronic
voting scheme that provides flexible anonymity as well as univer-
sal poll integrity validation. For this purpose, avisPoll relies on
an anonymous credential system and other cryptographic building
blocks. The system can be o↵ered as a cloud service which can give
everybody the possibility to organize a poll and define the eligible
voter set. Hence, the complexity of setting up a poll is significantly
reduced without reducing privacy and integrity guarantees. Finally,
we show a prototype implementation of avisPoll and give detailed
performance results. These results demonstrate that the system is
indeed practical for use, even on commodity hardware. For instance,
it takes ⇡ 150 milliseconds for a client to cast a vote, and ⇡ 25 sec-
onds for server to thoroughly verify 1000 votes.
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ABSTRACT
While there is a great number of electronic voting protocols
proposed in the literature, only a handful of them are actu-
ally deployed. Still, these few available schemes require vot-
ers to completely trust the poll provider with the anonymity
of their votes and/or the integrity of the results. More robust
schemes with better privacy and integrity guarantees do ex-
ist, however, they are complex to deploy and, therefore, are
not suitable for small to medium scale voting scenarios (e.g.
electing the board of directors of an international society).
In this paper, we present avisPoll, a practical electronic vot-
ing scheme that provides flexible anonymity as well as uni-
versal poll integrity validation. For this purpose, avisPoll
relies on an anonymous credential system and other cryp-
tographic building blocks. The system can be o↵ered as a
cloud service which can give everybody the possibility to or-
ganize a poll and define the eligible voter set. Hence, the
complexity of setting up a poll is significantly reduced with-
out reducing privacy and integrity guarantees. Finally, we
show a prototype implementation of avisPoll and give de-
tailed performance results. These results demonstrate that
the system is indeed practical for use, even on commodity
hardware. For instance, it takes ⇡ 150 milliseconds for a
client to cast a vote, and ⇡ 25 seconds for server to thor-
oughly verify 1000 votes.
1. INTRODUCTION
Opinion polls, surveys, referenda and elections are all in-
struments to solicit and collect the people’s opinions, con-
victions or preferences. In the past, casting a vote or taking
part in a poll required physical presence of the voter. When
the majority of population gained access to telephones, polls
could be taken remotely over the telephone, facilitating peo-
ple to express their opinion. Today, we can observe a trend
towards electronic and Internet voting. Internet voting fur-
ther facilitates the voting process, allowing voters to cast
their vote at any time during the poll, from virtually any-
where. In addition, due to its electronic nature, Internet
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voting allows for fast, automated tallying of the results. Fur-
thermore, it has severely lowered the requirements to set up
a poll. Websites and fora often organize opinion polls to dis-
cover the interests of their users. There even exist dedicated
service providers that o↵er to organize a poll in only a few
easy steps [16, 9].
However, Internet voting has several severe drawbacks,
which might not be apparent at first sight. Anonymity and
unlinkability of the voter and her vote is important in order
to avoid coercion or pressure by peers or lobbies. This is
not an easy requirement to fulfil without leaving a digital
trace of the voter’s identity, as only legitimate voters should
be able to vote and nobody should be able to vote twice.
In addition, because people can participate in an Internet
poll from virtually anywhere at virtually any time, the risk
of coercion increases. Because of the electronic nature of
Internet voting, the voting server can also tamper with the
vote outcome in an automated fashion. Another di culty
for many Internet-based polls is to prevent double voting.
Often, voters are first required to register an account with
the poll provider, usually recording only their email address.
This weak requirement allows malicious voters to easily set
up multiple identities with the poll provider in order to in-
fluence the poll results.
Any failure to fulfil the anonymity and integrity require-
ments by a voting system is a cause to question the poll
results it produces. If a voter can be linked to her vote, she
might decide not to participate in the poll, or express her
own opinion. Moreover, a coercer could verify in which way
someone voted and voters could easily sell their votes since
they would be able to prove that they voted a certain way.
In addition, if the poll result could be influenced without
it being detectable, the final outcome can never be trusted.
This is certainly the case for polls where the poll server has
an interest in the poll results. However, even if the poll
server is honest, it could be attacked by a third party or in-
fected by malware, allowing the poll results to be tampered
with [13].
In general, three types of Internet-voting systems can be
identified: 1) systems where the voter has to trust the server
to provide anonymity and integrity, 2) systems where the
voter has to trust the server to provide anonymity or in-
tegrity and 3) systems that do not need to be trusted to pro-
vide any guarantees. Of course, the latter type of system is
the most desirable. However, these systems often require an
elaborate setup and use complex and time-consuming cryp-
tographic tools, such as mix-nets and homomorphic encryp-
tion. The second type does not require an elaborate setup
and some are currently even o↵ering their services over the
internet [17]. Finally, current website/fora-based polls fall
into the first category, where the voter is required to fully
trust the system. These are only suitable for polls where
very little is at stake, as there are many examples of poll
organizers and attackers tampering with the outcome [11,
15].
In this paper we present a new electronic poll system,
avisPoll, which o↵ers flexible anonymity, significantly reduces
the setup requirements and needs less trust in the di↵erent
system entities. Moreover, the integrity of the poll results is
universally verifiable. Hence, avisPoll tries to find the mid-
dle ground between the second and third type of systems
described above. The trust requirements of avisPoll allow
for a poll service provider to o↵er the service of gathering
and processing polls over the Internet. Anyone can orga-
nize an online poll with this provider without requiring it to
provide voter anonymity or integrity guarantees. This sys-
tem is mainly designed with low-risk elections in mind, i.e.
elections where the stakes are not too high, or the risk for
coercion on a large scale is non-existent (e.g. electing the
representatives on a board, or choosing the chairman of a
meeting).
Voters first need to obtain a avisPoll account in order to
obtain an anonymous voting credential which can be used
to vote. The unlinkability properties allow avisPoll voters
to use the same credential in multiple polls while still pre-
venting voters to cast multiple votes in the same poll. In ad-
dition, the anonymous credential’s selective disclosure prop-
erties allow avisPoll organizers to target a specific group of
voters (e.g. adult females) without breaking the system’s
anonymity properties.
This paper makes the following key contributions:
• We present avisPoll, an electronic voting scheme that
provides flexible anonymity as well as universal poll
integrity validation. avisPoll can be o↵ered by an on-
line provider, which can allow any entity, whether it
is a large organization or the representative of a small
group of people, to set up a poll. Voters are required
to register in order to obtain an anonymous voting
credential. However, the same credential can be used
in multiple transactions thanks to the properties of
anonymous credentials. Furthermore, avisPoll requires
only little trust in the poll service provider and the
poll organizer, and can be extended to even lessen the
required trust.
• We made a prototype implementation of avisPoll and
show extensive benchmarks. In doing so, we prove
that avisPoll is scalable and practical to use, even on
commodity hardware.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives an
overview of the related work and Section 3 briefly explains
the preliminaries. Section 4 explains the scenario for avisPoll in
more detail, as well as our threat model. avisPoll’s protocols
are listed in section 5. We benchmark our prototype im-
plementation in section 6 after which avisPoll’s properties
are discussed. Finally, section 8 contains our conclusion, in
which we also show our plans for future work.
2. RELATEDWORK
Proposals exist that o↵er verifiable, i.e. open-audit voting
systems. The work of Adida [1] aims to provide strong in-
tegrity guarantees, however, vote privacy and unlinkability
relies on the fact that a subset of trustees will remain hon-
est. The system proposed by Clarkson et at. [7] is able to
o↵er either vote integrity or vote anonymity, but not both.
The use of anonymous credentials in voting schemes has
already been proposed in the past. These credentials are
ideal for proving a subset of personal attributes, while hid-
ing the user’s identity. Anonymous credentials are already
deployed in a real-world pilots. ABC4Trust’s pilot program
allowed university students to anonymously participate in
an online course evaluation [14]. It demonstrates that this
technology can be realistically utilised to provide required
integrity guarantees and user anonymity.
Proposals like [2, 3, 8] also utilise anonymous credentials.
However the entity that processes the votes must be trusted.
The user votes are not encrypted, and the integrity is not
guaranteed. In addition, users are only allowed to cast a
vote once and cannot change their opinion at a later time.
The work of Cetinkaya and Doganaksoy [6] formulates a
solution which utilises anonymous credentials to hide users’
identities. These credentials represent election information
together with a random number, blindly singed by the vot-
ing authority. They are unblinded and used as signed au-
thorisations to vote. The voting authority cannot identify
the voters, however, with this approach it is impossible to
verify the eligibility of users or have targeted elections. On
the other hand, a scheme proposed by Joaquim et al. [12]
relies on an ’Anonymizer’, through which users submit their
votes, in order not to be identified by the counting entity.
However, the users are not assumed to hide their identity
from the anonymising party and targeting voter sets is not
considered.
3. PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Anonymous Credentials
Anonymous credentials are cryptographic tokens with which
credential owners can prove statements about themselves
and relationships with organizations anonymously. avisPoll
makes use of the Idemix anonymous credential system [5]. In
a typical transaction, Idemix credential owners prove owner-
ship of their credential, in which they can choose to hide cer-
tain attributes. Furthermore, users can prove certain facts
about their credential by proving additional predicates. The
predicates that are important for avisPoll application are:
domain pseudonym and range proof. A domain pseudonym
is a value generated based the credential’s secret and a do-
main specification. Every credential owner can generate ex-
actly one unique domain pseudonym per domain. Hence,
this predicate can be used to limit the credential usage. By
proving a range proof, the credential owner proofs inequal-
ities of attributes in her credential. For instance, she can
prove that she is older than eighteen years without reveal-
ing her actual birthday. Finally, avisPoll makes use of Idemix
message signatures, in which messages are signed using the
Fiat-Shamir heuristic [10]
Service providers can specify what exactly users need to
proof in eligibility policies, such as the ABC4Trust presenta-
tion policies [4]. For example, the policy could specify that
a user needs to prove ownership of her poll-credential, her
domain pseudonym using the domain ’pollID’ and that she
is older than eighteen. The user can inspect this policy be-
fore she authenticates, and the attributes in her credential
which do not have to be revealed by the eligibility policy can
be hidden.
3.2 Merkle Trees
A Merkle hash tree is an, often binary, tree where the
leafs are the hashed values of data-blocks. The value of a
node is computed by hashing the concatenated values of a
node’s child-node. Using such a tree, the integrity of a data-
block can be validated simply by finding the corresponding
hashed value in the tree, and validating the leaf’s parent
nodes. Note that only a part of the tree is required to do
this. To validate the authenticity of a data block, the root
of the tree needs to be signed and the integrity of the data
block needs to be verified together with the signature of the
tree-root’s signature. Hence, only one signature is required
to proof the authenticity of any data block in the tree.
4. avisPoll
4.1 Scenarios
In a simple setup, avisPoll involves three participants: a
set of voters, an organization that wants to conduct an elec-
tronic poll and a poll provider. The latter is a third-party
that collects, processes and maintains the votes in a bulletin
board in the cloud. The poll provider o↵ers flexible scalabil-
ity: supporting votes with only a few participants to polls
with thousands, tens of thousands or even more eligible vot-
ers. An example of this setting could be polls or plebiscites
organized by the authorities (at the level of a city, region
or even country) to consult the population about a partic-
ular issue as happens quite often in some countries such as
Switzerland. By moving this process to the cloud, avisPoll
allows organizations to save costs by not having to deploy
the infrastructure themselves.
However, with this approach the organization loses a cer-
tain degree of control over the poll. The challenge is to guar-
antee the anonymity of the voters and the integrity of the
results (published on a bulletin board) if the poll provider
is malicious or is compromised by an adversary. Thus, the
main priority of avisPoll is to provide strong guarantees that
the poll provider cannot manipulate the poll results without
being detected. For example, the poll provider should not
be able to learn the contents of the votes before the orga-
nization closes the poll. Furthermore, if the outcome of the
poll can be known only by the organization, then the tal-
lying of the votes could be performed by the organization
itself. For highly sensitive polls, an organization could even
deploy their own private avisPoll service to avoid trusting a
third-party (at the associated cost).
The responsibility of the organization is to define the poll
and the voter’s eligibility requirements (i.e. how users prove
they are entitled to vote). In this simple scenario, some trust
is required by the voter in the organization. The organiza-
tion can either issue these credentials to the voters itself,
or rely on a trusted credential issuer, like the government,
to do so. In the latter case, the poll organizer requires less
trust from the voters, as it is not in control of the credential
issuing process.
4.2 Requirements
Based on the scenario described in the previous section,
avisPoll should satisfy the following requirements:
(a) Vote privacy. Voting should be anonymous, i.e. it
should be computationally di cult for any entity in
the system to identify voters by their votes only. More-
over, the data included in each vote should be generic
enough to avoid breaking privacy guarantees.
(b) Vote confidentiality. The data included in each vote
should not be revealed to any entity in the system
before the poll is closed, i.e. casted votes should be
encrypted. Thus, it should not be possible to discrim-
inate votes based on their content (e.g. omitting a
vote if its content is unfavorable). This requirement
also implies that it should be computationally hard to
tally the votes before the poll is closed, as a partial
result might influence the eventual outcome.
(c) Vote unlinkability. Di↵erent votes (in di↵erent polls)
of the same voter should not be linkable, in order to en-
sure both forward and backward secrecy of the voting
process.
(d) Vote unforgeability. It should be computationally hard
for an adversary to forge votes without being detected.
(e) Individual verifiability. A voter can verify that her own
vote is included in the published poll results and that
it is correct (i.e. it has not been modified).
(f) Universal verifiability. Any entity, internal or external
to the system, should be able to verify the correctness
of any vote in the published results. In particular,
anyone should be able to check that each vote in the
published results was cast by a valid voter, the vote
data has not been modified and only one vote per voter
exists.
(g) Double-voting prevention. Each eligible voter can only
cast one valid vote. The system could allow voters to
cast multiple votes, in which case only the last sub-
mitted vote will count. In addition, the system could
optionally allow voters to withdraw (i.e. cancel) sub-
mitted votes before the poll closes.
(h) Poll integrity. The system should detect if any legiti-
mate vote is removed from the poll before or after the
poll is closed (hence, when the collector of the votes is
unreliable, it can be proven that the poll was manipu-
lated).
(i) Prevention of large-scale coercion. The system should
not allow for large scale coercion or vote selling (i.e.
voters should not receive a receipt with which they can
prove how they voted). For this purpose, the system
may also allow voters to update the votes before the
poll closes.
(j) Practical trust model. The system should only require
a small number of entities with limited trust.
(k) Voter selection. The system should allow to precisely
target a particular set of eligible voters (e.g. only fe-
male students of MIT or CMU universities in the age
between 20 to 22 are allowed to participate).
(l) Selective disclosure. The system should allow for col-
lecting extra information about the voters; this ex-
tra information should be correct (i.e. endorsed by a
trusted party). Moreover, the collection of additional
information about a voter should always be subject to
the voter’s consent.
(m) Scalability. The system should be e cient and scal-
able, i.e. it should support polls with tens of voters to
polls with thousands or more voters.
4.3 The avisPoll roles
Poll Service Provider (PSP).
The PSP o↵ers poll services to organizations for a fee. It
allows organizations to create and configure polls. For each
poll, the PSP receives, validates, processes and stores the
votes cast by eligible voters. Moreover, the PSP vouches for
the integrity of the bulletin board that contains the stored
votes. If a organization chooses to, the PSP could also tally
the votes once the poll is closed. In most scenarios, other en-
tities have no access to the votes processed by the PSP (i.e.
votes are stored in servers controlled only by the PSP). Fur-
thermore, the PSP may also provide the client application
that is used to participate in the poll. Still, organizations
could also choose client applications internally developed or
from other providers (we assume that the voting protocols
are publicly known).
Poll Organizer (PO).
The PO represents the organization that wants to create a
new poll using PSP’s services. When creating a new poll, the
PO defines di↵erent properties such as: questions, eligibility
policy, validity period and participant entities. Using the
eligibility policy, the PO defines the type of credentials and
attributes voters need to have in order to participate in the
poll.
In small scenarios, it is likely that the PO will also issue
credentials and receive complaints from voters. However,
if voters cannot trust the PO with the outcome of the poll,
additional entities may be required to reduce the risk of such
a threat, as we describe next.
Poll Auditor (PA).
The PA’s goal is to reduce the risk of fraud by the PO
(e.g. if the PO colludes with the PSP). For this purpose, it
validates and certifies the polls created by the PO and the
corresponding results. It also splits with the PO any secrets
used to encrypt the votes. Moreover, the PA could also
monitor that the poll credentials are correctly issued. Also,
voters and external reviewers can complain with the PA if
any anomaly in the poll process is detected. Depending on
the scale and value of the poll, one or more PAs could be
used.
Credential Issuer (CI).
The CI issues the credentials that voters need to partici-
pate in the poll. It can be part of the organization (e.g. HR
department) or a trusted third-party (e.g. the government).
In general, credentials are issued following well-defined and
audited procedures, e.g. specified by the PA. The use of a
CI also reduces the required trust in the PO.
Voter.
A voter is a member of the organization with a valid cre-
dential, obtained from the PO or CI. An eligible voter must
be able to prove that she owns a valid credential, and that
the information contained in this credential can satisfy the
eligibility policy.
4.4 Threat model
avisPoll targets poll scenarios with low to medium value
and risk of coercion. That is, we do not target high risk
polls or elections, where some parties might want to buy
votes from voters or coerce them to vote in a particular way.
Thus, avisPoll should not be used when the stakes are high.
In our threat model, organizations have low trust in the
PSP. The PSP could be malicious or it could be compro-
mised by an adversary. A malicious or compromised PSP
may try, therefore, to change the outcome of the poll. For
example, the PSP may try to manipulate votes, inject forged
votes, deny or delete genuine votes, report wrong results, or
replace votes with older versions of themselves (if the poll al-
lows voters to update their votes). Moreover, a malicious or
compromised PSP may try to link votes to the identities of
the voters or reveal the results of the poll to non-authorized
parties, thus, breaking the anonymity and confidentiality
guarantees of our system.
Voters could also mistrust the PO. For example, a mali-
cious PO may collude with the PSP to manipulate the re-
sults of the poll (e.g. omit unfavorable votes from the final
tally) or to reveal the identity of certain voters. A mali-
cious PO may also try to created specially crafted polls to
reveal voters’ identities, issue bogus credentials (if the PO
has such capability) or share encryption keys with the PSP
to reveal the contents of the votes and compute results be-
fore the poll is closed. To reduce the impact of a malicious
PO, the organization can introduce a separate CI and one
or more PAs. In our threat model, the CI and the PAs are
honest-but-curious parties, i.e. they follow the protocols but
the may try to break privacy guarantees based on the data
they have or to share such data with other parties (e.g. the
PSP).
Voters could also be malicious. During the voting process,
malicious voters may try to vote even if they are not eligible
for the targeted poll (i.e. they do not belong to the target
voter set). Malicious voters may also try to vote more than
once when such action is not allowed or submit an invalid
vote (e.g. random bits). Finally, malicious voters may try
to frame the PSP or PO and accuse them falsely of having
manipulated the poll.
Finally, our threat model does not consider denial of ser-
vice attacks or attacks against the voters’ computers HW
and SW, including the poll client application (e.g. large-
scale attacks to steal voters’ credentials or control voters’
computers).
5. AVISPOLL PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
5.1 Assumptions
We assume that voter anonymity and unlinkability are not
a↵ected by other channels (e.g. IP-based tracking). In ad-
dition, we assume that the voters have access to the general
parameters, keys and certificates made available by the PO
and PSP. The avisPoll client has access to a local copy of the
PSP’s and PO’s certificate authority. Finally, the following
pid
Voting Period Poll questions
pkEpid, pk
S
pid Eligibility Policy
PO, PAs signatures
Figure 1: Poll Description contents
protocols describe avisPoll with all its entities, i.e. includ-
ing PAs and CI. Note that the responsibilities of these two
entities can be taken up by the PO.
5.2 Voter registration
Before a voter can cast a vote, she needs to obtain an
anonymous Idemix credential, referred to as the avisPoll-
credential. These credentials are issued by the PO or a
trusted credential issuer (e.g. the government). avisPoll-
credentials can contain additional, personal information which
can be used by the PO to limit the eligible voter set. Note
that using personal information in an anonymous credential
is not privacy-intrusive (see section 3.1). The PO decides
when voters are able to register for a credential, e.g. it
can allow or deny voters to register when a poll is already
started.
In order to obtain such a credential, the voter first au-
thenticates, after which her identity is validated. Finally,
the voter is issued a corresponding avisPoll-credential. This
process can be audited by a PA.
5.3 Poll setup
To set up a poll with the PSP, the PO generates a poll
description (figure 1).
This description contains a unique poll identifier, the ques-
tions of the poll and the eligibility policy which is used to
select the target voter group and avisPoll-credential require-
ments. Furthermore, the poll description entails the voting
period and the public key used to encrypt the votes by the
voter. Finally, all this data is signed by the PO (and option-
ally the PAs), and the resulting signatures are appended to
the poll description. A PA formally approves the poll by
signing the poll description. Furthermore, users are able to
report any detected discrepancies to any PA that signed this
description.
As mentioned, the poll description contains a poll public
key. This key will be used by voters to encrypt their vote.
The corresponding private key is available only to the PO
during the poll. However, if a PA is participating, the pri-
vate key is split among multiple parties. This reduces the
risk that the PSP could get hold of this private key and start
decrypting votes before the poll is over.
After the poll description is created, it is made public
by the PSP, PO and PAs. Finally, the PSP prepares the
database in which it will store the valid votes.
5.4 Voting phase
5.4.1 Poll opening
Before the voting phase can start, the PSP prepares the
database that will contain the processed votes (table 1). The
exact purposes of each table column will be discussed in
TLS setup
Get Poll with PID=pid
1
2
3
4
Poll User Poll Service Provider
5
PollDescrpid, ts
Nympidu ,  
pid
u , E(pkpid, vu)
PAVpidu
Figure 2: avisPollvoting protocol. After a TLS con-
nection has been set up and the client has authen-
ticated the server, the client sends an Idemix proof
in which the encrypted vote is signed.
detail in this section. To signal the start of the voting phase,
the PSP inserts a special opening vote in the database. This
record has a default value as domain pseudonym (OPEN),
and does not contain actual vote-related values. However,
it does specify a time stamp, which symbolizes the starting
time of the poll.
After the voting phase is finished, the PSP inserts a closing
vote in the database. Similar to the opening vote, this vote
specifies CLOSE as domain pseudonym and its time stamp
symbolizes the closing time of the poll. The closing vote
does not contain actual vote-related values.
5.4.2 Vote creation (voter)
Before a voter can vote, she has to obtain the poll descrip-
tion. First, the signatures contained in the poll description
are validated using the voting-client’s locally stored certifi-
cates. Second, the voting client presents the user with the
questions she needs to answer. Thereafter, the vote can be
cast according the the protocol described in figure 2.
The avisPoll client app sets up a TLS connection with the
PSP. Furthermore, the application authenticates the PSP
using its locally stored certificates. Thereafter, the PSP
server will send the poll description, PollDescrpid and a
time stamp, ts to the avisPoll client. The client app veri-
fies whether this time stamp makes sense (should be close
to the current time and greater than any previously received
time stamp).
At this point, the client application can construct the
client’s vote. First, the poll answers are encrypted. The
client generates an AES key (skey) with which it encrypts
the vote and then encrypts skey using the public encryption
key (pkEpid) that is retrieved from the poll description.
VoteEu ⌘ E(pkEpid, vu) ⌘ asymE(pkEpid, skey), symE(skey, vu)
Second, it generates the poll-specific domain pseudonym,
Nympidu , constructs a proof according to the eligibility policy
embedded in the poll description, which proves not only the
ownership of a valid Idemix credential, but also proves the
domain pseudonym and additional predicates if these are
required by the eligibility policy. In addition, the encrypted
vote and the time stamp are signed in this proof. The proof,
⇡pidu , together with the encrypted vote and ts is sent to the
PSP.
5.4.3 Vote validation (PSP)
When the PSP receives ⇡pidu , it starts a validation process:
Nym PIV PAV EncryptedVote Proof Timestamp Vote Symm. key
OPEN PIVopen PAVopen null null topen null null
CLOSE PIVclose PAVclose null null tclose null null
Nympidu PIVu PAVu Vote
E
u ⇡
pid
u tu Voteu skeyu
Table 1: avisPoll database table structure. In addition, the table lists the contents of the opening and closing
votes as well as the contents of a regular vote.
Idemix  Proof of ownership
"I own a valid voting credential"
Nympidu
Credential Predicates
- Univ = CMU or MIT 
- Age > 18
... 
Idemix Signature
E(pkpid, vu)||ts
Figure 3: avisPoll vote contents. The voter con-
structs an Idemix signature-proof of ownership of
the avisPoll-credential. In this proof, a domain-
pseudonym is proven relative to the poll identifier
while the encrypted vote and time stamp are signed.
Optionally, further predicates are proven if required
by the eligibility policy.
1. Verify that the time stamp used in the signature-proof
⇡pidu is equal to the one sent to the voter.
2. Check if the domain pseudonym, Nympidu , is present in
the database.
(a) Refuse or update the vote (if allowed) if the do-
main pseudonym is present and the time stamp,
ts, is more recent than that of the stored vote, tu.
3. Check the validity of signature-proof ⇡pidu .
4. Verify whether ⇡pidu satisfies the eligibility policy.
If the proof validates, the PSP constructs a poll integrity
value or PIVu. This value is a cryptographic hash of the
received poll information. (VoteEu represents the encrypted
vote.)
PIVu = H(Nympidu || VoteEu || ⇡pidu || ts)
Next, the PSP creates the poll authenticity value or PAV.u
This is a signature on PIVu using the PSP’s private key,
prSpid, corresponding to the public key, pk
S
pid, contained in
the poll description.
PAVu = S(prSpid, PIVu)
Thereafter, the PSP inserts a new record in the database
(or updates an existing record), the values of which can be
seen in table 1. The ’vote’ and ’symmetric key’ values of this
record are reserved for the Tally phase and, hence, remain
empty.
Finally, the PSP sends PAVu to the voter, and thereby, the
PSP commits to the user that it has processed and registered
the voter’s vote. The PSP hereby hands the evidence to the
user that his vote is in the database.
5.4.4 PAVu validation (voter)
After PAVu is received, the user computes PIVu from its
local data and uses it to validate the received PAVu. The
avisPoll client app stores PAVu, ⇡
pid
u , ts and the vote (vu),
as it might be required in the rebuttal period. If the PSP
does not provide a (correct) PAV, the client application will
send a complaint to the PO (and PAs).
5.5 Poll closure
The PSP will insert the CLOSE record in its database
when the poll end-date, as specified in the poll description,
has passed. Next, the PSP constructs a Merkle-tree from
every PIVu in the database, including PIVopen and PIVclose.
The PSP signs the top node of the tree, and sends the tree,
signature and an image of its database to the PO (and PAs).
The PO (and PAs) verify the tree, after which the tree is
signed again and published.
5.6 Rebuttal period
Once the tree is signed by another entity than the PSP,
the latter is not able to tamper with the poll results without
it being universally detectable. The PSP can indeed remove
votes from its database before constructing the tree. How-
ever, this can be detected by the owner of the deleted vote,
which has the PAVu as proof that the missing vote was prop-
erly recorded. The rebuttal period is a period between the
poll closure and the tally phase in which users can report
missing votes. If missing votes are detected, the votes can
either be recast, or the poll can be declared invalid. Re-
casting a vote means sending the original vote together with
PAVu to the PO (or PA), who validates the proof and PAVu
before reinserting the vote. Note that the rebuttal period
could also be part of the verification phase.
5.7 Tally phase
Before the votes can be tallied, they need to be decrypted.
If one or more PAs are participating in the poll, the PO and
PAs recombine their key-shares into the private decryption
key prEpid. For each vote in the database, the encrypted
vote is decrypted and the vote’s record is updated with the
decrypted vote and the symmetric key skey with which the
vote is encrypted. Once the votes are all decrypted, the tally
operation is trivial.
5.8 Verification
At any point after the PSP has released its database con-
taining the votes, the PO, PAs, voters and other entities can
start verifying the integrity of the poll.
5.8.1 Vote verification
To validate a single vote, the following actions need to be
performed:
1. Retrieve the database row of the the desired vote. This
can be done either at random, or a domain pseudonym
can be used as key.
2. Check if the vote’s time stamp is between the opening
an closing vote’s time stamp or the times specified in
the poll description.
3. Verify if no other vote has been cast using the vote’s
domain pseudonym.
4. Verify the Idemix proof as well as the fact that the
proof’s signature is correct. Also verify that the proof
satisfies the poll’s eligibility policy. This verifies whether
the correct domain pseudonym was generated as well
as whether or not the voter was eligible to vote.
5. Compute the PIVu and verify whether it is equal to
the one in the database row.
6. Verify the PAVu with regard to the computed PIVu.
7. Verify if the vote has been decrypted correctly by de-
crypting the encrypted vote using the database row’s
’symmetric key’ attribute, and match the result with
the ’decrypted vote’ attribute of the database row.
Note that this process is less complicated if a voter verifies
her own vote. She can retrieve her vote using her domain
pseudonym and match the PAVu directly with her local copy.
A mismatch would mean that the vote has been tampered
with, as the local PAVu is already validated by the voter
when it was received. Hence, steps 2 and 4-6 are not required
when a voter validates her own vote.
5.8.2 Validating the Merkle-tree
The Merkle tree can either be partially or fully validated.
The full validation requires to check the presence of every
PIVu in the tree, and to check the absence of leaf-nodes
which are not a PIVu in the database. In addition, the
other nodes (which are the result of hashing their two child
nodes) have to be validated. This whole process is most
easily performed by recreating the whole tree, and matching
the top nodes of the original and newly created one. Finally,
the signatures of the top node have to be validated.
To partially validate a the tree, the presence of each to be
verified PIV is checked in the tree. Afterwards, the branches
leaving from the PIV’s leaf node to the top node are vali-
dated as well as the top node’s signatures.
6. PRACTICAL EVALUATION
6.1 Performance
We have implemented the avisPoll system as a client and
server application in the Java programming language. We
installed the avisPoll server component on a workstation with
an IntelR  Core
TM
i7-3770 CPU, Ubuntu 13.04 (linux 3.11).
The server is equipped with mysql 14.14 and Java SE 1.7.
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Figure 4: Times in milliseconds of the Merkle tree
related operations. We measured the total time for
the database operation, tree construction and tree
verification.
The client application ran on a machine with an IntelR 
Core
TM
i5-3210M and Java SE 1.7.
To cast a vote, the client constructs a proof which satis-
fies the eligibility policy. In this case, the policy specified
that the voter proves ownership of her voting credential, an
Idemix credential with seven attributes and a 2048-bit key
size, and proves a domain pseudonym relative to the poll
identifier. In this proof, she signs her encrypted vote and
the received time stamp. Afterwards, the client receives a
PAV, which she verifies by reconstructing the PIV and val-
idating the received PAV based on the locally created PIV.
This process was repeated 100 times. The proof generation
takes on average 142.5 ms (standard-deviation = 8). Veri-
fying the PAV takes on average 4 ms (standard-deviation =
2)1.
To process the incoming votes, the server needs to validate
the Idemix proof. This includes checking whether the proof
satisfies the eligibility policy. In addition, the server needs to
create the PIV and PAV, and finally create a new record in
the database before sending the PAV to the client. The PIV
uses SHA-256 as hashing algorithm, while the PAV is created
using a 2048-bit RSA signature. The test were repeated 100
times. Proof validation takes on average 105 ms (standard-
deviation = 5). Creating the PIV and PAV requires 11
ms (standard-deviation = 4) and finally the database insert
takes on average 47 ms (standard-deviation = 17.5)2. Ex-
cept for the database operation processing proofs can easily
be parallelized.
To illustrate the scalability we have ran tests on our server
machine to measure the Merkle tree operations, vote decryp-
tion and vote verification on a database containing 1k, 5k,
10k, 25k, 50k and 100k votes. Figure 4 shows the times to
execute the two core operations involved in retrieving the
PIVs from the database and constructing the tree. In ad-
dition, the time required to verify the tree is listed, during
which the tree is reconstructed (we assume that a list of all
1All measurements do not include network time.
2Note, however, that we have not optimized the database.
Hence, this result could be improved.
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Figure 5: avisPoll decryption time in minutes. We
measured the required time for decrypting the en-
crypted votes as well as the time to update the
database.
PIVs is present), the top-nodes of the original and recon-
structed trees are compared and the signature is verified.
The results show that all three operations initially take up
about the same time and slowly increase linearly until we
reach the 50k database. The times to construct and verify
the tree increases at the same rate, however the database op-
eration grows much faster. This is probably due to memory
issues caused by the collection of a large amount of objects
in a list.
Next, we measured the required time for decrypting the
poll and updating the records (figure 5). The first step is the
actual vote decryption. This operation is relatively cheap.
Our system decrypted one hundred thousand votes in about
4.5 minutes and scales linearly with the amount of votes.
The database update, however, is more time consuming.
Updating five thousand records already takes longer than
decrypting 50 000 votes. Where the vote decryption grows
with about 2.7 ms per vote, the update operation grows with
nearly 40 ms per operation. Again, this can be improved by
optimizing the database.
The results of vote verification can be seen in figure 6.
As expected, the poll verification increases linearly with the
number of votes in the database. Verifying 10 000 votes
takes up almost 15 minutes, while verifying 100 000 votes
costs nearly 150 minutes on our server. Since verifying a
large poll should not be an interactive process, we consider
this a good result. Furthermore, verifying 1000 votes is done
within 25 seconds. By means of extrapolation, we can infer
that verifying 100 votes would take less than 2.5 seconds,
which is a good result for a small poll.
As can be seen in table 2, the main part of verifying a vote
is to verify the Idemix proof, and check if the proof satis-
fies the eligibility policy. Note that this time might increase
with regard to the used credential and required additional
predicates in the proof, and, hence, the overall time to verify
a vote is a↵ected by the number of attributes in the creden-
tial (less is better), and the set of predicates that need to be
verified in the proof.
However, even though the system’s performance might de-
crease because of the type of proof, we also show that veri-
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utes. To illustrate the scalability of avisPoll we
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Operation Percentage
check PIV 0,2 %
check PAV 1,2 %
Validate Domain pseudonym 5.4 %
Validate Proof 93,7 %
Validate Decryption 0,5 %
check time stamp 0 %
Table 2: Relative amount of work required to
validate a single vote in a database with 10 000
votes. Verifying the domain pseudonym requires a
database lookup and hence, will grow with an in-
creasing database size.
fying votes is perfectly parallelizable (figure 6). Our multi-
threaded verification application increases the performance
by a factor 3.85, which is an excellent result for a machine
with four physical cores.
To illustrate that it is feasible that clients could partici-
pate in the verification process, we have verified 1000 votes
on our client machine using our multi-threaded application.
We took 100 samples, of which the mean value is 74.4 sec-
onds with a standard deviation of 9.4. Taking into account
that verifying votes scales almost perfectly linear in time,
we can extrapolate that verifying 50 000 votes would take
just over 60 minutes on a standard client machine.
6.2 Data consumption
In order to cast a vote, the client first receives the poll
description and a 256-bit extended time stamp from the
server. The proof that the client returns is a 6 KB XML
string, which includes the 0.5 KB large encrypted poll an-
swers. Hence, the amount of data that the client sends to
the server is 5.5 KB plus the size of the encrypted answer
string. Finally, the server sends a 2048-bit PAV to the user.
As table 1 shows, the database contains a lot of redundant
information. The domain pseudonym, time stamp, and en-
crypted vote columns can all be extracted from the proof.
This redundancy, however, does dramatically improve the
performance. Although this redundant information requires
the system to store more data, the actual database size is
relatively small. One vote record, including decrypted vote,
takes up about 20 KB. Hence, a database with 1000 votes is
about 20 MB, and a 100 000 vote database contains 2 GB
of data.
7. DISCUSSION
This section evaluates the properties of avisPoll. Namely, it
discusses security, anonymity, unlinkability, trust and prac-
ticality of the design.
7.1 Security
avisPoll implements all necessary mechanisms to protect
against attacks with regard to our threat model (Section 4.4).
The system relies on the Idemix anonymous credential
system to provide vote verifiability, vote unforgeability and
double-voting prevention. A vote is embedded in a valid
Idemix proof which satisfies the poll’s eligibility policy. In
addition, the Idemix proof also proves a domain pseudonym
relative to the poll identifier that has not been used in the
poll so far. Also, the vote’s authenticity is accomplished by
signing the actual (encrypted) content of the vote in this
proof. Hence, the security of a avisPoll-vote is dependent on
the used Idemix security parameters (e.g., a 2048-bit RSA
modulus).
The task of the PSP in avisPoll is to gather votes from
voters, to validate and to store them. The PSP is not able
to influence the poll outcome during this process without
being detected. For each vote, the PSP generates a PIVu,
which is a cryptographic hash of the whole vote, and a PAVu
which is the signature of that hash, after which it sends the
PAVu to the voter. If the received PAVu is valid and the
voter’s vote does not appear in the final bulletin board, the
voter can prove with her PAVu that the PSP had correctly
processed the vote. Hence, she can prove that her vote has to
have been omitted from the bulletin board at some point in
time. If the PSP returns an invalid PAVu, or nothing at all,
the voter can send a complaint containing her vote (Idemix
proof). Using this proof’s domain pseudonym, the PO or PA
can verify whether or not the vote is present in the bulletin
board (once it has been published), and if it is the same
vote. However, because the actual answers are encrypted,
the PSP cannot make a conscious decision whether or not
to to follow the protocol and processing a vote correctly.
Hence, the PSP is not able to influence the outcome of the
poll. Once the voting phase is completed, the PSP generates
a signed Merkle tree, which is verified and signed by the PO
and PA. Once this action is completed, nobody is able to
modify any poll data without it being detectable using this
Merkle tree. Furthermore, each voter is able to verify the
existence and integrity of her own vote using her local data
(domain pseudonym and PAVu), and all entities can verify
all votes in the bulletin board. Hence, we consider the poll
integrity and verifiability requirement as fulfilled.
Finally, avisPoll can minimize the possibility of coercion
since the PO can allow voters to update their votes. If voters
are coerced to answer in a certain way, they can easily up-
date their vote before the poll is closed. However, this would
allow voters to get more than one PAVu, which they could
use to prove the absence of their original vote. However,
this problem is solved thanks to the time stamp embedded
in the proof. If multiple votes are made under the same do-
main pseudonym and the votes are valid, then those proofs
must have been made by the same voter. A voter thus can-
not argue that she did not updated her vote if she is in the
possession of the PAVu from the original vote.
7.2 Anonymity and unlinkability
In addition to many of avisPoll’s security properties, its
privacy and unlinkability properties are achieved by the use
of the Idemix credential system. Note that the anonymity
and unlinkability of the communication channel used is or-
thogonal to our proposed solution and is not discussed in this
paper. Although voters are not unlinkable if they perform
multiple actions in the same poll, they are unlinkable over
multiple polls. Each poll will have a unique poll identifier,
and hence, the voter’s domain pseudonym will change. This
allows avisPoll-credentials to be reused in multiple polls.
Furthermore, the poll’s eligibility policy might require vot-
ers to reveal information embedded in the credential. This
can range from proving that the voter works in the HR
department, to proving in a range proof that she is older
than eighteen. It is clear that the revealed information
should never identify the voter, or put the voter in a small
anonymity set.
Because avisPoll uses anonymous credentials, the di -
culty of credential revocation arises. However, this can be
solved by using a validity period in the avisPoll-credential.
For each poll, voters are then required to proof that their
credential contains a valid validity period. When the creden-
tial expires, the voter is required to update her credential.
A similar approach would be to integrate a version number
in the credential. Each subsequent poll would specify an
increasing version number, making it possible to limit the
usage of the credential to maximum N polls by updating
the credential’s version number with the value M + N (M
being the latest poll version number).
7.3 Trust
One of avisPoll’s goals is to minimize the required trust
assumptions for all entities. In a system setup with two en-
tities, the PSP and PO, the following trust assumptions are
required. First, the PO cannot collude with the PSP by
sharing the poll specific decryption key. Indeed, if the votes
can be decrypted before the Merkle tree is signed and pub-
lished, the PSP could decrypt votes and discriminate based
on its content (i.e. not returning a PAVu). Second, the
PO must only issue one credential per valid voter. Handing
out multiple credentials to a particular entity, or to itself,
will allow the entity to cast a vote for each credential in its
possession, and hence influence the result. However, this at-
tack is limited because the bulletin board containing all the
votes is made public as it can be detected if participating
in the poll is mandatory, or it is known that only a small
part of eligible voters did not vote. Finally, the PO must
correctly process incoming complaints (e.g. a missing-vote
complaint). avisPoll does not require trust in the PSP ex-
cept for the first assumption, the fact that the PO and PSP
do not collude. We argue that it is not unreasonable that
these requirements are no problem for low-risk polls such as
electing the representative on a board.
However, if any of these three assumptions cannot be
made, avisPoll requires the introduction of one or more ad-
ditional entities. The first and third assumptions can be
met by introducing one or more PAs. The PAs and PO each
hold a share of the decryption key. By requiring N shares
to compose the decryption key, avisPoll greatly reduces the
possibility that votes can be decrypted before the Merkle
tree is signed. Furthermore, the PA does not have a reason
to not process complaints correctly, as it does not have in-
terests in the outcome of the poll. Finally, the PAs could
audit the PO’s credential issuing process to ensure that the
right credential is handed to the right person. In addition,
avisPoll also allows credentials to be issued by a trusted
third party (e.g., the government).
The avisPoll application is very important for avisPoll. It
needs to create the votes, verify the results and send com-
plaints. Hence, the application users have to put a lot of
trust in this application (e.g., trust that it does not encode
an identifier in all communication). For this reason, the com-
plete avisPoll specification to interact with the PSP, PO or
PAs should be public knowledge. This means that any party
can build its own avisPoll application. Furthermore, mak-
ing such applications open source is a solution to this trust
issue.
7.4 Practicality
Practicality is a very important goal of avisPoll. Because
the PSP is a cloud provider, everybody can act as a PO,
set up a poll and invite the voters to participate. Voters do
require a voting credential in order to participate in a poll.
However, a voter can participate in multiple polls using the
same credential while access to polls can be limited to a
target group.
We also show that avisPoll is scalable and parallellizable.
Even voters have the capability to quickly verify a small to
medium sized poll, as our results show that it takes just over
a minute to verify 1000 votes on a client machine.
Finally, avisPoll relies on voters to check the presence
of their own votes. Voters can also validate (part of) the
results. This, however, does not benefit the usability of
avisPoll. That is why the avisPoll-application should be able
to perform these checks automatically, and automatically
compose and send complaints.
8. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
This paper described avisPoll, a voting scheme for small
to medium-sized, low-risk, Internet-based polls that provides
among other features vote anonymity and poll integrity. In
addition, the system only requires one entity to collect and
process votes, and one entity that organizes the poll and de-
fines the eligible voter set. avisPoll requires its participating
entities to only put little trust in each other. However, ad-
ditional entities might be introduced to lessen these trust
requirements to a minimum. A poll service provider can of-
fer its services over the internet. Hence, avisPoll is easy to
set up in practice as anybody can use the service provider
and organize a poll. Furthermore, our experimental results
show that the system is scalable, the processing time does
not blow up with regard to any of avisPoll’s parameters (e.g.
size of poll, number of questions asked, etc.). In addition,
vote validation is perfectly parallelizable and can even be
done by the voters themselves.
Our future plans for avisPoll is to further develop our pro-
totype implementation into a functional poll service provider
and a usable client application for voters and poll organizers.
As mentioned in the discussion section, the client application
and specification should be open source. This way, voters
can fully trust what the application is doing or some might
even implement their own version.
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